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Abstract
This paper looks in to the process of environmental degradation and the resultant
externalities in the context of groundwater depletion in drought prone regions.
The main objective here is to estimate the costs of groundwater depletion exter-
nalities and examine the costs and benefits from groundwater replenishing mecha-
nisms in different ecological contexts. This study shows how groundwater exploi-
tation in India is resulting in economic losses to individual farmers apart from
ecological degradation. It is argued that policies towards strengthening the re-
source base (abatement mechanisms) and equitable distribution of the resource
(property rights) would be beneficial, economically as well as ecologically.
The cost-benefit comparison is in favour of investment in replenishment mecha-
nisms such as irrigation tanks and percolation tanks. The situation of over extrac-
tion and the resultant environmental degradation is a consequence of lack of
appropriate and adequate policies (policy failure) for managing the subsurface
water resources. Hither to, groundwater policies (subsidised credit, power, etc) are
in the nature of encouraging private initiatives in groundwater development. While
these policies helped in promoting groundwater development in the regions where
groundwater development was below potential, they have led to over exploitation
of the resource in fragile resource regions. On the other hand, no attempts were
made (at the policy level) to strengthen the natural resource base in terms of
replenishing the water table. On the contrary, groundwater development is seen
as a substitute for tanks, which are the main agents of replenishment.
Key words: Environment, Degradation, Groundwater, Externalities, Costs, Andhra
Pradesh, South India.
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I Background
Water is among the most ill managed resources in India, which is resulting
in severe scarcity, both for drinking and irrigation, as well as environmental
problems such as water logging in endowed regions and desertification in
fragile regions. Of late there has been great emphasis on judicious
management of water at the policy level.  Market (pricing) and institutional
(user participation) approaches are suggested to overcome the strident
problems. However, these policy changes so far have been limited to surface
irrigation.  An important segment of water resources (groundwater), which
covers most of the rain-fed regions (covering 2/3 of the total cropped area)
of India are more or less neglected. In the absence of any effective policy
measures groundwater regions are plagued with water scarcity, inequitable
distribution of water and environmental degradation. The situation seems to
have aggravated during the recent years, especially in the arid and semi-
arid regions of the country (Reddy, 2001).
Water resources in the form of tanks, groundwater and canal water are
among the important CPRs. CPRs are defined as natural or manmade
resources with attributes of non-exclusion and substractability (Singh,
1994). It may be noted, however, that all the water resources may not fall
strictly under the above definition in all situations. In reality, most of these
resources do not represent pure forms of open access, communal or
state property, as they are mixtures of these three idealised types (Berkes
and Farvar, 1989). A classic example is groundwater in India. A groundwater
basin is a common pool resource in the sense that exclusion of multiple
users (pumpers) is difficult and costly. Groundwater tables go down, as
water is extracted beyond optimum yield level (withdrawals exceed
1replenishing capacity of the aquifer) and may even lead to drying up of
the aquifer in fragile environments. The capital intensity of groundwater
extraction makes it easier to exclude rival users especially in fragile
resource regions where the high cost of groundwater extraction coupled
with low and inequitable asset ownership makes the resource privy to a
few well-to-do households. This gives rise to ‘free riding’ externalities.
These externalities differ in nature and intensity depending on biophysical
and climatic conditions. These externalities may not be a serious problem
in the absence of degradation or unlimited availability of groundwater. For,
in the regions with greater groundwater potentials markets help in
internalising these externalities to a large extent (Shah, 1993). On the
other hand, fragile resource regions need external interventions for
internalising these externalities.
This paper is an attempt to estimate the costs environmental degradation in
the context of groundwater depletion and the resulting externalities. Important
issues in this regard include identifying various externalities associated with
groundwater depletion in fragile environments and the costs associated with
these externalities. Further, the rationale for external interventions such as
environmental investments in abatement mechanisms in terms of private
costs and benefits are investigated. That is, costs of groundwater depletion
Vis a Vis costs of groundwater replenishing mechanisms in fragile resource
regions. This study is based on primary data collected at the household
level from three villages experiencing groundwater situations. The paper is
organised as follows: the following section presents the conceptual
framework of the study. Section three discusses the approach of the study
along with the profile of the study villages. While section four examines the
externalities associated with groundwater degradation / depletion and the
costs of such externalities are estimated in section five. And the last section
summarises the findings and puts forth some pointers for policy.
2II. Conceptual Framework
Externalities arising out of groundwater depletion could be stock related,
cost related and strategic in nature (Provencher, 1998). Stock externalities
arise when all the available resource stocks are exploited. In the case of
renewable resources this happens when extraction rates go beyond
sustainable yield rates. There is also a danger of loosing the resource
permanently if the non-renewable portions of the stocks are exploited. This
could result in drying up of the aquifers. Cost related externalities arise when
the costs of extraction become uneconomical to exploit the resource or
costs go beyond the reach of some individuals. These costs are private as
well as social in nature. Private costs arise due to cost related externalities,
which are mainly use values or user costs. Where as social costs arise due
to stock related externalities that include use and non-use values such as
protecting the resource for future generations, existence values, etc.
Externalities could take place at the intermediary level in the event of market
imperfections, especially credit market. That is, in the event of inequity in
access to capital across sections of the community, those who do not have
access to capital will be left out of resource extraction activity due to
increasing costs. These distortions in capital markets in turn give rise to
strategic externalities where a few individuals with access to capital
strategically capture all the available resources. This creates monopoly power
in the water markets. This may be termed as technological externalities
also, as the technology used to extract water is costly (Fig.1). Added to this
heterogeneity in spatial distribution of groundwater creates the problem of
assignment. The problem assignment is further complicated, as land (under
which groundwater lies) rights are privately owned. The intertwining of private
and common resources results in further externalities, which can be termed
as legislative externalities (Fig. 1). Legislative externalities arise when there
is no clear-cut legislation demarcating and protecting different property
regimes. For instance, in India property rights in land may be purely individual
(highly concentrated), or purely collective (attenuated) though there exist
many intermediate forms between these two extremes (Bell, 1990).
Legislative externalities reinforce technological externalities.
3On the other hand, while groundwater is a common pool resource in which
rights are limited to use and income deriving, it is also sold and transferred
along with land due to its link with land. But, legislation is not clear in
specifying how groundwater should be managed judiciously and distributed
equitably. As a result, farmers make private investment assuming that they
have absolute rights to the groundwater aquifer beneath their land.  These
situations arise not only due to the nature of the resource but also due to the
existing institutional arrangements. For, in other situations (California, USA)
a groundwater basin is treated and used as a CPR in the pure sense of the
term (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994; Chapter. 13).
While negative externalities are associated with the extraction of the resource
positive externalities are associated with resource investments in abatement
or mitigation measures for replenishing groundwater. The positive
externalities associated with resource investments are in the nature of
reviving or creating water bodies such as percolation tanks / replenishment
mechanisms. The positive externalities are seen in terms of recharge of
groundwater through these systems. It was estimated that the recharging
capacity of a normal percolation tank is about 7.87 mm/day while a de-
silted percolation tank can recharge up to 20.40 mm/day (Patel, 2002). And
the radius of this impact ranges from 1.1 km to 0.72 km depending on the
type of soil.
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Source: Adopted with modification from Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994).
4In the context of agrarian economies these externalities affect the household
utility through changes in net returns to farming. For water is the main source
of irrigation and the productivity of irrigated agriculture is substantially higher
than that of un-irrigated agriculture. Therefore, we conceptualise the
household profit maximisation behaviour as the basis for our analysis. In
the normal resource conditions household’s profit function can be expressed
as:
Pit = {[Pyt * Yit (Xit, Dit-1)] – [PCt (Xit, Dit-1) – (Zct)]}——1
Where:
Pit = Net income or profit to HH in ith household in year t
Py = Price of Output in year t
Yi = Output of the ith HH
Xi= Vector of inputs
Dt-1= Resource degradation in the year t-1
PCt= Production Costs
Zt= Vector of environmental / resource investments by community
/ public
Objective is to maximise Pit, fulfilling the following conditions:
dPit/dy  > 0
d2Pit/dy  < 0
In the event of resource degradation different households face different profit
functions with profit maximisation objective. These households can be
grouped as resource rich and resource poor. The profit function faced by
each group can be written as:
Prr = {[Pyt * Yrrt (Xrrt, Drrt-1)] – [PCt (Xrrt, Drrt-1) – (Zct)]}  —— 2
Prp = {[Pyt * Yrpjt (Xrpt, Drpt-1)] – [PCt (Xrpt, Drpt-1) – Zct)]}—— 3
5Where, rr represents resource rich and rp represents resource poor farmers.
In the event of negative externalities:
Prr # Prp in the short run due to technological or strategic externalities, as
resource rich farmers tend to appropriate more resources using their
resource position while resource poor find it difficult to invest in the absence
of access to credit. It may be noted that here physical degradation may be
same in both the cases but only resource rich have the capacity to invest
and attract extract.
P rr Prp in the long run due to stock externalities. Exploitation rates
exceeding sustainable yields as the resource is exhausted. Over extraction
may even result in use of non-renewable part of the resource. Ultimately
this would result in the tragedy of commons in the absence of cooperative
strategies.
III  Approach
Three villages facing groundwater degradation and water scarcity were
selected from Warangal district of the Telangana region of the state1. These
villages represent different levels of groundwater situation and reflect the
overall situation in the district as well as the state. The three villages -
Vanaparthy, Teegaram and Vaddicherla - represent no-scarcity (good),
average and scanty (scarce) groundwater status respectively. Thus, the
sample villages range from reasonably good availability of groundwater to
acute shortages (including drinking water). There are no alternative sources
of supply in two of the villages, while in one village an existing tank has
been converted in to a percolation tank, where the water situation is much
better (Vanaparthy). This village provides an opportunity to explore the
linkages between surface and groundwater bodies.
1.  This region is reported to have serious groundwater problems in the recent  years.
6Table 1
 Details of Sample Selection
Village Total Area Percentage Number of Wells Sample Size
(acres)  area
Irrigated Open Bore Total Well- Inten-
owners sive
1. Vanaparti 3791 25 50 105 155 Census 25
2. Teegaram 2124 19 104 61 165 Census 25
3. Vaddicherla 2970 15 30 145 175 Census 25
The analysis was carried out at two levels. At the first level, well census
was carried out in all the villages in order to get a complete picture of well
irrigation and its status. Basic information on well irrigation was collected
using a small questionnaire from all the well owners in the sample villages.
At the second level, detailed information regarding various socio-economic
aspects was collected using a detailed questionnaire from a sample of 25
households owning the wells. These sample households were selected using
the probability proportionate (to size) sampling. Details of the sampling are
presented in Table 1. The method of before and after scenarios was used in
order to understand the impact of the changes in recent years. Care was
taken to minimise the problems relating to memory lapse2. This was done
through the method of cross checking at different points of interview as well
as with the information collected from well census. Moreover, memory lapse
was not very serious, as the collection of data is restricted to the last five
years. That is, households were asked to narrate the changes in groundwater
situation during the last five years.
Basic features of these villages (Vanaparthy, Teegaram and Vaddicherla)
are almost similar in terms of occupational pattern, cropping pattern,
infrastructures and social services. In all the villages small and marginal
farmers are in majority except in Teegaram where the proportion of medium
2. Though using panel data over a period of time is the best to address this problem, it
is beyond the scope of the study due to the time constraint.
7size farmers is quite high (Table 2).  There are no landless households in
Teegaram village. Despite this Teegaram has the lowest average annual
household income. Of the three sample villages, Vanaparthy has the highest
average household income followed by Vaddicherla and Teegaram. This is
mainly due to the reason that the main livelihood activity in these villages is
cultivation and the main source of irrigation is well. That is, household income
is dependent on the status of groundwater. And Vanaparthy has the highest
proportion of its area under irrigation. Besides, the cropping pattern, which
influences average household income, in these villages differs substantially.
Table 2
Socio-economic Characteristics of the Sample Villages
Vanaparthy Teegaram Vaddicherla
1. No.of Households 700 350 800
2. AverageHouse-hold size 5.5 6.1 38
3. Average Farm Size 4.78 5.15 5.52
4. % area Irrigated 56 41 38
Economic Categories
(% Households)
Large Farmers 11 07 09
Medium Farmers 25 43 19
Small Farmers 29 34 25
Marginal Farmers 32 16 41
Land Less 03 0.0 06
Social categories(% Households)
OC 29 26 25
BC 53 36 50
SC / ST 18 38 25
8. Main Occupation Cultivation    Cultivation Cultivation
9. Average Income (Rs./HH/year) 21900 12500 16600
Note: OC= other castes; BC= Backward castes; SC/ST= Scheduled castes and
tribes.
Figures in brackets are sample size.
8Status of Groundwater
Dependence on groundwater is total in all the sample villages. There are no
alternative sources of water supply in two of the villages, while in one village
an existing tank was converted in to a percolation tank, where the water
situation is much better. In the other villages also there are tanks but fallen
to disuse due to various reasons. Concentration of wells, open as well as
bore, is quite high in all the villages. Proportion of households owning wells
ranges from 17 per cent (Vaddicherla) to 37 per cent (Teegaram) in the
sample villages (Table 3). Distribution of wells is in favour of large and medium
farmers in Vanaparthy, while it is in favour of small and marginal farmers in
Table 3
Distribution of Well Owners by Economic Class and Well Type.
Land Category Number of Households Having
Open Bore Both Total % of
Wells wells Wells
dried up
Vanaparthy [700] 43 100 9 152 (22) 45
Large Farmers [77] 13 37 7 57 (74) 48
Medium Farmers [175] 5 42 1 48 (27) 71
Small Farmers [203] 13 17 1 31 (15) 28
Marginal Farmers [224] 12 4 0 16 (07) 15
Teegaram [350] 69 40 21 130 (37) 52
Large Farmers [25] 2 1 4 07 (28) 33
Medium Farmers [50] 27 14 15 56 (37) 26
Small Farmers [119] 21 12 2 35 (29) 59
Marginal Farmers [56] 19 13 0 32 (57) 90
Vaddicherla [800] 19 108 8 135 (17) 85
Large Farmers [72] 2 11 3 16 (22) 69
Medium Farmers [152] 7 28 1 36 (24) 84
Small Farmers [200] 6 41 4 51 (25) 86
Marginal Farmers [328] 4 28 0 32 (10) 90
Note : Figures in [] indicate the total number of households. Figures in ( ) indicate
the respective percentages to total number of households.
Source: Village Well Census survey.
9Teegaram and Vaddicherla (only small farmers). The higher proportion of
ownership among small and marginal farmers in these villages may be due
to large-scale well failures / drying up among small and marginal farmers.
Of late most of the open wells are converted in to bore wells by putting in-
well bores, as most of the open wells have dried up and water tables have
gone down substantially during the last 5 years.
During the last five years 85 per cent of the wells, mostly open wells have
dried-up in Vaddicherla while 45 and 52 per cent of the wells dried-up in
Vanaparthy and Teegaram respectively. Interestingly, in all the villages,
except Vanaparthy, the burden of well failure was borne mainly by small
and marginal farmers. In Vanaparthy where groundwater situation is
reasonably good, well failure among small and marginal farmers is
substantially lower when compared to large and medium farmers. That is,
small and marginal farmers become the first victims of the onset of
environmental degradation. This is mainly due to the location disadvantages
apart from the poor quality of soils they own. For, small and marginal farmers
operate on small stretches of aquifers due to their small size of holdings. In
most of the regions small and marginal farmers are endowed with rocky
and poor quality soils located on the ridges, where groundwater resources
are limited and also difficult to extract.
The average depth of bore wells is higher in the scarcity villages. Across
the size classes the variations in depth are more in the scarcity village.
Bore wells owned by large farmers in Vaddicherla are deeper than that of
marginal and small farmers (Table 4). These differences tend to dilute as we
move to less scarcity village (Vanaparthy). However, bore wells owned by
small and marginal farmers seem to irrigate less area per well is all situations.
This reflects the disadvantages faced by small and marginal farmers in
terms of access to the common pool resources. This is a clear case of
negative externalities resulting from over extraction of groundwater.
10Table 4
Depth of Wells and Area Irrigated by Wells across Size Classes
Land Category Average Depth (in feet) Avg. Horse - Area Irrigated per
power of bore well (acres)
bore wells
Bore wells Open wells Kharif Rabi
Vanaparthy 87 (110-200) 36 (30-50) 3.97 1.87 1.11
Large Farmers 118 (130-200) 34 (30-50) 3.00 2.50 1.24
Medium Farmers 81  (110-180) 32  (30-50) 4.28 1.87 1.03
Small Farmers 106 (110-180) 39 (30-50) 4.20 2.00 1.13
Marginal Farmers 127 (110-150) 39 (30-50) 3.67 1.11 1.04
Teegaram 116 (110-150) 45 (25-50) 3.53 1.37 0.55
Large Farmers 116 (110-130) 48 (42-50) 3.00 1.72 1.00
Medium Farmers 116  (120-130) 45  (25-50) 3.85 1.46 0.58
Small Farmers 129 (120-150) 47 (30-50) 3.92 1.32 0.37
Marginal Farmers 123 (150-150) 42 (30-50) 3.00 0.98 0.25
Vaddicherla 131 (60-300) 39 (24-60) 3.63 1.05 0.53
Large Farmers 163  (90-300) 31  (30-50) 2.89 1.23 0.87
Medium Farmers 125  (90-220) 48  (35-60) 4.57 1.23 0.51
Small Farmers 129 (60-200) 40 (30-50) 4.88 0.99 0.46
Marginal Farmers 108 (150-170) 30 (24-40) 3.00 0.76 0.28
Source: Village Well Census survey. Figures in brackets indicate range.
Besides, small and marginal farmers seem to face market disadvantages
as well. Despite little variations in the depth and horse power used in the
bore wells these farmers tend to spend more money per well in terms of
capital costs as well as running costs towards maintenance, etc (Table 5).
Running costs mainly include maintenance (repairs) costs and electricity
charges. Electricity is charged flat rate per year. These annual rates are Rs.
1080 per 3-horse power motor and Rs.1320 per 5-horse power motor3.
Variations in costs across size classes would be much higher in terms of
per unit of area irrigated, as the area irrigated per well is lower on small
andmarginal farms. Across the villages the capital costs range from about
Rs. 26 thousand in Vaddicherla to Rs. 31 thousand in Teegaram while the
3. In April 2002 these rates were increased to Rs. 1800 and Rs. 2640 respectively.
11working costs range between Rs. 2803 (Vanaparthy) and Rs. 2959.
Interestingly, the per acre costs reflect the status of groundwater in the
sample villages. On per acre basis both capital and running costs are the
lowest in Vanaparthy (no-scarcity village) and highest in Vaddicherla
(scarcity village). Perhaps the high per unit costs may be responsible for
driving the farmers in to debt trap.
Table 5
Costs of Bore Well Irrigation (in rupees)
Land Category Costs per well Costs per acre
irrigated
Capital Running Capital Running
Vanaparthy 29073 (16000-65000) 2803 (300-500) 9756 941
Large Farmers 27787 (20000-65000) 2711 (300-5000) 7430 725
Medium Farmers 29522 (16000-60000) 2920 (600-5000) 10180 1007
Small Farmers 32555 (22000-60000) 2695 (1200-4000) 10401 861
Marginal Farmers 25500 (18000-30000) 3150 (1200-1200) 11860 1465
Teegaram 31230 (15000-65000) 2941 (1200-3000) 16266 1532
Large Farmers 24000 (20000-25000) 2060 (1200-2400) 8824 757
Medium Farmers 23694 (15000-30000) 2196 (1200-2400) 11615 1076
Small Farmers 34785 (18000-60000) 3070 (1200-5000) 20583 1817
Marginal Farmers 48153 (15000-65000) 3769(2500-5000) 39149 3064
Vaddicherla 26753 (15000-60000) 2959 (1000-10000) 16932 1873
Large Farmers 26821 (20000-40000) 2796 (1000-10000) 12772 1331
Medium Farmers 25027 (15000-40000) 2760 (1200-6000) 14383 1586
Small Farmers 28094 (17000-35000) 3015 (1500-10000) 19375 2079
Marginal Farmers 26429 (20000-60000) 3278 (1500-5000) 25413 3152
Source: Village Well Census survey. Figures in brackets indicate range.
12III Resource Degradation and Externalities
Groundwater situation in the region is changing by year due to the ever-
increasing pressure on the resource. In majority of the locations groundwater
extraction has crossed the threshold level of maximum sustainable yield
leading to drying up of swallow wells and bore well failures. This is mainly
due to the mining of groundwater aquifers without improving the replenishing
mechanisms. Distribution and access to groundwater is uneven and varies
within a microenvironment (village). Access problems or externalities get
aggravated in the light of deteriorating groundwater resources. Our sample
villages provide an opportunity to understand the dynamics in terms of the
impact of such degradation in diverse ecological situations. Here we examine
the externalities due to groundwater depletion.
Prior to getting in to details of the cost of degradation, a household income
function is estimated in order to establish the impact of groundwater
degradation on agriculture production. Agriculture production is converted
in to value terms due to measurement problems across crops. Ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates were carried out using the data from 426
well owners in all the 3 sample villages4. The estimated specification is as
follows:
Yht = 3682.27* + 763.88 TLNDht* + 19.64 DEPT* – 0.03 DEPT2 + 68.33 %AIRIht* +
(2.45) (10.36) (2.37)      (1.19) (5.19)
174.01 EDUHHht*  - 187.49 HHSZEht – 651.55 VDTRM  -1448 VDVDC***
(2.31) (1.04)       (0.74) (1.62)
R2 = 0.34; N= 426
Note: Figures in brackets are t values. * and *** indicate levels of significance at 1 and
10 per cent respectively.
4. Though we estimated a profit function at the crop level using the sample households the
results were not significant due to the small sample.
13Where,
Yht = Income in rupees of the household ‘h’ in time ‘t’.
TLAND = Total land owned by the household in acres.
DEPT = Depth in feet of the well owned by the household.
DEPT2 = Squared value of the DEPT.
%AIRI = percentage of area irrigated of the household.
EDUHH = Education of the head of the household in years.
HHSZE = Size of the household in numbers.
VDTRM = Village dummy of Teegaram (average village)
VDVDC = Village dummy of Vaddicherla (scarcity village)
The estimates indicate a positive relation between groundwater depth (DEPT)
and household income (Yht). Though not significant the positive sign of the
square of depth (DEPT2) indicates that the income is rising at a declining
rate. This indicates that there is economic rationale for well deepening. But,
all the farmers can’t afford it due to resource constraints. Proportion of area
irrigated (%AIRI) and total land (TLND) of the household has a positive
impact on household income, which needs no explanation given the
importance of irrigation and size of the holding. Education of the head of the
household (EDUHH) has a positive impact on income indicating that better
education means better use of inputs and production. As expected income
levels are lower in the Teegaram (average) and Vaddicherla (scarcity) villages
when compared to Vanaparthy (no scarcity) village.
Over the last five years well population (total wells) in the sample villages
has gone up in all the villages though the composition of wells has changed.
The extent of growth ranges from 39 percent in Vanaparthy to 68 percent in
Vaddicherla (Table 6). The growth in well population does not seem to have
any relation either with the status of groundwater or the rate of well failure.
In all the villages the expansion of well irrigation (number of all wells) is
mostly on large and medium farmers though small farmers have recorded
higher rate of expansion in Vaddicherla. In all the villages there is significant
decline (about 60 percent) in the number of open wells. On the other hand,
number of bore wells has increased many folds in all the villages. In majority
of the cases small and marginal farmers have resorted to bore wells
14consequent to the decline in open wells. In other words, the cost of resource
degradation is mainly born by the small and marginal farmers. This coupled
with their fragile resource base could explain the indebtedness in this region
to some extent.
Table 6
Changes in Number of Wells, Depth and the Reasons for Change During
the Last Five Years
Village/size class % Change in number of Wells and Depth Reasons for change
(% of farmers)
Open wells Bore wells Total 1 2 3 4
No. Depth No. Depth wells
Vanaparthy -61 67 400 13 39 44 44 08 28
Large Farmers 00 67 00 50 00 67 67 0 67
Medium Farmers -80 33 @ 100 100 17 17 17 0
Small Farmers -75 87 450 11 30 30 30 10 20
Marginal Farmers -33 80 100 00 20 83 83 0 0
Teegaram -58 75 200 36 52 48 0 16 16
Large Farmers 00 108 75 56 75 33 0 0 0
Medium Farmers 00 108 150 36 75 43 0 14 28
Small Farmers -83 67 450 20 50 70 0 20 10
Marginal Farmers -50 36 300 33 20 20 0 20 20
Vaddicherla -67 31 2700 56 68 56 0 0 28
Large Farmers -58 36 700 41 15 44 0 11 44
Medium Farmers -67 25 @ 67 167 100 0 0 0
Small Farmers -100 50 @ 50 200 71 0 0 29
Marginal Farmers -67 11 @ 64 67 20 0 0 20
Note: Positive change in depth indicates declining groundwater table. Depth is measured
in terms of availability of sufficient water below the ground level, as perceived by the
farmers. However, some farmers may go deeper than this keeping long-term interests and
affordability.
Source: Intensive sample survey.
Reasons: 1= Groundwater level decreased, Open wells dried-up; 2= Tank converted in to
Percolation tank; 3= Neighbour farmers installed bore wells, 4= No other sources are
available. Change is due to bore wells only, as the number of open wells declined over
the years.
Source: Intensive sample survey.
15Apart from the changing composition of wells depth of wells has increased
considerably over the period of five years. Increased depth of wells means
higher capital and running costs. Capital costs increase due to deepening
of open wells, conversion of open wells in to in-well bores and replacement
of open wells with bore wells. All the open wells have motors with 3 HP
while most of the bore wells have 5 HP motors. All the sample villages
experienced substantial decline in water levels in open wells during the last
five years (Table 6). Since open wells usually do not cross 40-50 feet the
average depth has saturated at 50 feet in all the villages. The differences in
the depth during the base year have resulted in marginal changes in depth
in Vaddicherla. On an average open wells have recorded about 4 feet decline
in water table per year in Vanaparthy and Teegaram while it is more than 2
feet in Vaddicherla. The decline is much sharper in the case of bore wells.
Depth of bore wells increased by 35 feet (7 feet per year) in Teegaram and
55 feet in Vaddicherla (11 feet per year) during the last 5 years. Where as,
the increase was only 13 feet (2.5 feet per year) in Vanaparthy. This is
mainly attributed to the percolation tank, as most of the bore wells have
come up in the vicinity of the tank. It may be noted that as the water stress
increases small and marginal farmers tend to go deeper in search of water.
For, large farmers could invest in deeper wells even before the scarcity
sets in. In the event of scarcity small and marginal farmers are forced to go
deeper. Besides, location disadvantage of these farmers adds to their owes.
However, this is not true in the case of open wells, which are labour intensive
and hence small and marginal farmers are at an advantageous position due
to their family labour.
The most important reason, according to the farmers, for the increase in
bore wells is the declining water table and drying up of open wells (Table 6).
In Vanaparthy the expansion is attributed to the conversion of an irrigation
tank in to percolation tank in the recent years. The second important factor
is the natural expansion, as there is no other source of irrigation. While the
first reason stems out of the externality problems, trigger mechanism does
not seem to be an important reason (3) for the expansion. Impact of declining
water table and the drying up of open wells is reflected in the changes in the
composition of wells over the period.
16While declining water tables and well failure is the first and second casualties
of groundwater degradation, decline in irrigated area, cropped area, shifts
in cropping pattern and declining yield rates are the externalities of
degradation. Despite the increase in number of bore wells and depth of the
wells the area under well irrigation declined in all the sample villages
(Table 7). The decline is more in terms of gross area irrigated than net area
irrigated indicating that rabi (January-April) crops were affected more.
Decline in net area irrigated ranged from 10 percent  in  Vanaparthy  to  24
Table 7
Changes in Area Under Irrigation and Cropping Pattern
Village/ % change area % change in area under crops
Size class irrigated
Net Gross Paddy Cotton Gingelly All Crops
Area Area
Kharif Rabi Kharif Rabi
Vanaparthy -10 -14 -17 -17 163 86 11 -17
Large Farmers 00 -10 -20 -28 @ @ 74 -28
Medium Farmers -18 -19 -18 -21 100 -27 -06 -21
Small Farmers -12 -13 -20 -13 00 550 00 -13
Marginal Farmers -03 -02 -2 00 00 00 05 00
Teegaram -24 -24 -30 -43 37 @ -01 -43
Large Farmers -13 -21 -33 -38 38 00 00 -38
Medium Farmers -44 -15 -44 20 17 @ -08 20
Small Farmers -18 -29 -18 -48 73 00 10 -48
Marginal Farmers -20 -37 -26 -75 33 00 -11 -75
Vaddicherla -18 -30 -22 -50 27 138 -05 -50
Large Farmers -12 -24 -15 -52 83 100 -02 -52
Medium Farmers -15 -31 -32 -50 00 @ -07 -50
Small Farmers -20 -26 -20 -35 -67 00 -05 -35
  Marginal Farmers -39 -47 -39 -77 00 75 -35 -77
percent in Teegaram. Where as, the decline in gross area irrigated ranged
from 14 percent in Vanaparthy to 30 percent in Vaddicherla. Size class wise
variations indicate that the loss of area under irrigation is more on marginal
holdings in the scarcity villages. This supports our earlier observation that
17small and marginal farmers suffer more as the water stress increases. It
may be noted that rabi crops (gross area irrigated) are affected more in the
scarcity village (Vaddicherla) when compared to kharif crops (net area
irrigated). Thus, the huge costs incurred on bore wells by farmers failed to
keep the area under irrigation in tact. This is mainly due to the appropriation
externalities coupled with the degradation of the resource.
Paddy is the main and most preferred crop despite poor groundwater
conditions in the region. Despite the adoption of high value crops like cotton,
chillies, groundnut, etc., farmers still prefer paddy. Farmers are not willing to
shift away from paddy (not yet) even after the recent glut in the paddy market.
The reasons could be that paddy continues to be more profitable than other
crops in these villages and the efforts (supervision) involved in paddy crop
are much less compared to commercial crops like cotton or chillies. In fact,
paddy is known as lazy man’s crop. Despite high preference as well as
profits farmers are forced to shift away from paddy due to water scarcity
during the recent years. Farmers are shifting towards irrigated dry crops in
the place of paddy. In some of the villages farmers more or less stopped
growing rabi paddy. The actual shifts in cropping pattern in the sample
villages are presented in Table 7. Paddy is the only rabi crop grown in the
sample villages. All the villages recorded a decline in the area under rabi
crop. The decline ranges from 17 per cent in Vanaparthy to 50 per cent in
Vaddicherla. Even the area under kharif crops has declined in two of the
villages while it has gone up in Vanaparthy. This indicates that water stress
has adversely affected the net sown area. The decline is more in the scarcity
village (Vaddicherla) when compared to the moderate village (Teegaram).
Paddy, kharif as well as rabi, is the main loser while dry and irrigated dry
crops like gingelly, cotton, etc., have gained in terms of area allocations.
Area under kharif paddy declined by 17 per cent in Vanaparthy followed by
22 per cent in Vaddicherla and 30 per cent in Teegaram. Water stress will be
severe during the rabi season, which is more prominent in the moderate
(Teegaram) and scarcity (Vaddicherla) villages. However, variations in water
stress between kharif and rabi seasons are not much in Vanaparthy due to
the presence of the percolation tank. The decline in area under paddy,
18especially rabi paddy, is the highest among marginal and small farmers in
scarcity and moderate villages. Apart from the changes in the cropping
pattern yield rates, especially paddy, have declined over the period of five
years. Changes in the yield rates are attributed mainly to water scarcity in
the recent years. Depending on the water stress paddy yields have declined
by 4 to 16 per cent during kharif season and by 7 to 10 per cent during
rabi season. Vanaparthy has recorded the lowest decline in paddy yields
(Table 8).
Table 8
Changes in Yield Rates of Paddy (quintals / acre)
Village/ % changes in Net Returns per acre of (in Rs.)
Size class yields
Kharif Rabi Kharif Rabi Cotton Gingelly
paddy paddy  paddy  paddy
Vanaparthy -04 -07 8848 (2.6) 8797 (1.9) —- —-
Large Farmers -00 -07 8111 (2.8) 8625 (1.5) 4812 (1.1) 3270 (4.8)
Medium Farmers -08 -04 10186 (3.4) 9410 (2.0) 4767 (1.3) 4120 (4.7)
Small Farmers -08 -07 7046 (2.0) 8490 (2.0) 10889 (3.5) 3110 (2.5)
Marginal Farmers 00 -17 10148 (2.5) 8660 (1.9) —- 3320 (2.0)
Teegaram -16 -10 9577 (2.6) 7672 (2.4) 3754 (0.6) —-
Large Farmers -14 -13 12812 (4.4) 7160 (2.1) 7688 (1.5) —-
Medium Farmers -14 -06 9205 (2.8) 8480 (2.5) 1938 (0.3) —-
Small Farmers -27 -17 6536 (1.4) 7975 (2.5) -668 (-0.08) —-
Marginal Farmers -07 -04 9755 (2.6) 7080 (2.6) 6060 (1.4) —-
Vaddicherla -14 -08 8851 (2.7) 7755 (2.0) 4257 (0.9) 2902 (2.5)
Large Farmers -12 -15 8698 (3.1) 5970 (1.3) 3898 (0.6) 3595 (2.6)
Medium Farmers -10 -04 11161 (3.7) 7845 (2.5) 5842 (1.4) 3640 (2.7)
Small Farmers -17 00 9128 (2.2) 7380 (2.0) 3031 (1.0) 2650 (2.4)
Marginal Farmers -14 -14 6417 (2.2) 7110 (2.0) —- 1725 (2.2)
Note: Figures in brackets indicate cost-return ratios.
However, changes in cropping pattern and yield rates need not necessarily
result in loss of income to the farmers. For, they may shift to more
remunerative high value and low water intensive crops. But, the changes in
the sample villages do not indicate any such shift, as paddy happens to be
19the most remunerative crop in these villages. Relative crop economics are
highly favourable to paddy both in kharif and rabi seasons (Table 8). In most
of the cases paddy has net returns that are double that of next most
remunerative crop i.e., cotton. More importantly returns on per rupee
investment (cost) are quite high for paddy when compared to cotton. This
reflects the risk involved in growing these crops due to high investments.
As a result, marginal farmers do not grow cotton in two of the villages.
Gingelly is the second most preferred crop, which has comparable cost-
return ratios with paddy. But gingelly is not as remunerative (net returns) as
paddy or cotton. Therefore, shift away from paddy is a net loss to the
household farm income. Resource degradation in terms of groundwater table
thus adversely affects household income through shrinking of area under
irrigation as well as shifts in cropping pattern.
Thus, the externalities arising from groundwater depletion can be viewed
from two angles i.e., horizontal and vertical in nature. Though the type and
impact of these externalities does not differ, the victims differ. Impact of
resource degradation externalities that are borne by the entire community
(farmers) can be termed as horizontal in nature. On the other hand, the
impact seems to be disproportionately borne by the marginal and small
farmers, which can be termed as vertical in nature. While mitigation measures
would help solving the problem of horizontal externalities, internalising or
removing technical and legislative distortions is necessary to address the
vertical externalities. The crux of the problem is to understand the magnitude
of the costs of externalities and whether mitigation measures are cost
effective. The following section estimates the costs of groundwater
degradation and compares with mitigation costs.
IV.     Costs of Degradation Externalities
There are number of appropriation (negative) externalities associated with
groundwater depletion. These externalities range from decline in area irrigated
to drying of trees and desertification. While all these impacts are not observed
in the study region, a few of the negative impacts can be quantified in
20monetary terms. The actual costs of externalities can be compared with the
abatement costs (assuming that the impacts are not irreversible yet) for
policy action. Abatement costs are the costs of converting the existing tanks
in to percolation tanks that would replenish the groundwater. The positive
externalities of percolation tanks are evident from one of the study villages
(Vanaparthy). The difference in losses between Vanaparthy and the other
two villages can be attributed to the percolation tank. This implies that there
are some savings or benefits in Vanaparthy due to the positive externalities
of the percolation tank. These benefits can be compared with the costs of
restoring percolation tank. A part of these costs could be internalised
(depending on the benefits) and a part can be borne by the state in the
public interest.
Despite large private investment in groundwater exploitation the area under
irrigation declined over the period of five years. Besides, the cropping pattern
has shifted away from the more remunerative water intensive paddy crop
to other less remunerative dry crops. As a result farmers have incurred net
losses, direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include the investments made
in bore wells and loss of capital due to drying up of open wells. These costs
may be termed as ‘sunk costs’ in the case of drying up of open wells and
‘replacement costs’ in the case of new bore wells that have replaced the old
open wells. Direct costs are one time costs and are likely to increase over
time along with the drying up of open wells and increase in the number of
bore wells. These costs cumulate till groundwater tables totally dry-up or go
down beyond reach (too expensive). Indirect costs are those costs that are
incurred due to decline in the area under irrigation (paddy) and the changes
in cropping pattern. Indirect costs are recurring costs that may grow at an
increasing rate as the water table goes down. Since all the irrigated area is
devoted to paddy crop, indirect costs are estimated at two levels. Firstly,
the loss in net returns per acre due to the decline in net sown area under
irrigation. Here net returns are taken from the paddy crop, as paddy is the
only crop grown under irrigated conditions. Secondly, losses due to cropping
pattern changes are estimated by taking the net return differential between
21paddy and other crops (weighted average)5 that replaced paddy and the
decline in area under paddy are used to estimate the losses due to shifts in
cropping pattern. It may be noted here that we are not estimating all the
indirect costs of groundwater degradation due to lack of full information and
measurement problems. Therefore, we limit our estimates to some of the
prominent costs like area and crop changes, which are more relevant for
private investment decisions.
The direct (sunk + replacement) costs range from Rs. 2744 per acre in
Vanaparthy to Rs. 13159 per acre in Vaddicherla (Table 9). At the household
level these costs are substantial ranging from Rs. 18 to 42 thousand among
the sample villages. Though there is no clear pattern in these costs across
size classes at the household level, on per acre basis the burden seems to
be much higher on small and marginal farmers in all the sample villages.
These high costs destabilise the household economy, as the withstanding
capacity of these farmers is low. This is more so in the scarcity villages
where burden is more coupled with the instability in crop production.
Compared to direct costs the burden of indirect costs is much less, per
household as well as per acre. Indirect costs range from Rs. 605 per acre in
Vanaparthy to Rs. 1910 per acre in Vaddicherla (Table 10). In the case of
indirect costs also the burden is disproportionately born by small and marginal
farmers in most of the cases on per acre basis though the reverse is true if
we look at per household losses. On per household basis these costs range
from Rs. 4990 in Vanaparthy to Rs. 8173 in Teegaram.
5. Weighted average is calculated based on the proportion of area under the crop.
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Direct (Sunk + Replacement) Costs of Groundwater Degradation (in Rs)
Village/ Open wells Bore wells Total Direct Direct
Size class No.of Cost of Total No.of Cost of Total cost Direct cost per cost per
open wells cost new a bore (replace- costs house- acre
wells (sunk) bores ment) hold
Dried
up
Vanaparthy 44 17429 766876 92 29073 2674716 3441592 22642 2744
Large 20 16739 334780 41 27787 1139267 1474047 25860 1782
Medium 17 17000 289000 37 29522 1092314 1381314 28777 4667
Small 05 18071 90355 14 32555 455770 546125 17617 5354
Marginal 02 18250 36500 0 25500 0 36500 2281 1259
Teegaram 56 19134 1071504 42 31230 1311660 2383164 18332 3831
Large 02 21667 43334 1 24000 24000 67334 9619 732
Medium 12 17278 207336 19 23694 450186 657522 11741 1889
Small 16 19696 315136 11 34785 382635 697771 19936 5673
Marginal 26 22053 573378 11 48153 529683 1103061 34471 11031
Vaddicherla 101 19725 1992225 140 26753 3745420 5737645 42501 13159
Large 11 15742 173162 25 26821 670525 843687 52730 6158
Medium 26 23752 617552 36 25027 900972 1518524 42181 10694
Small 38 19300 733400 52 28094 1460888 2194288 43025 17696
Marginal 26 20750 539500 27 26429 713583 1253083 37909 36855
Table 10
Indirect Costs of Groundwater Degradation (in Rs)
Village/ Decline in paddy Differen- Total loss (Rs.) Total Loss Loss
Size class  area (acres) tial Net loss per per
returns* Kharif Rabi (Rs.)  house-  Acre
Kharif Rabi  (Rs.) hold
Vanaparthy 69.25 39 7007 485235 273273 758508 4990 605
Large Farmers 41 37 6154 252314 227698 480012 8421 580
Medium Farmers 22 15 8464 186208 126960 313168 6524 1056
Small Farmers 14.5 5.5 5177 75067 28473 103540 3340 1020
Marginal Farmers .35 0 10015 3509 0 3509 219 120
Teegaram 89.75 51 7549 677523 384999 1062522 8173 1708
Large Farmers 9 7 8323 74907 58261 133168 19024 1455
Medium Farmers 86.5 10 8062 697363 80620 777983 13892 2236
Small Farmers 10.75 11.25 6761 72681 76061 148742 4250 1209
Marginal Farmers 11.5 9.75 9095 104593 88676 193269 6040 3248
Vaddicherla 21.25 92.43 7327 155691 677235 832926 6170 1910
Large Farmers 7.75 31.36 6998 54234 219457 273691 17106 2001
Medium Farmers 18.35 25.65 8798 161443 225669 387112 10753 2733
Small Farmers 13.15 16.13 8825 116049 142347 258396 5067 2091
Marginal Farmers 15 28.5 6055 90825 172567 263392 8231 7747
Note: Differential net return is arrived at by subtracting the net returns of the crops that
replaced paddy from the net returns of paddy.
23On the whole the total per acre costs (direct and indirect) of degradation
range from Rs. 3349 in Vanaparthy to Rs. 15069 in Vaddicherla (Table 11)6.
On both the accounts the costs are substantially lower in Vanaparthy. This
is mainly due to the presence of percolation tank in this village. For, in all the
villages more than 80 per cent of the respondents felt lack of proper
maintenance of the tank or its low capacity as the reasons for the present
status of groundwater.  And  the next  important  reason is  the  increased
Table 11
 Total Costs (direct and indirect) of Groundwater Degradation (Rs./acre)
Village/ Costs due to groundwater Total costs
Size class degradation (Rupees per acre)
Direct Indirect
Vanaparthy 2744 605 3349
Large Farmers 1782 580 2362
Medium Farmers 4667 1056 5723
Small Farmers 5354 1020 6374
Marginal Farmers 1259 120 1379
Teegaram 3831 1708 5539
Large Farmers 732 1455 2187
Medium Farmers 1889 2236 4125
Small Farmers 5673 1209 6882
Marginal Farmers 11031 3248 14279
Vaddicherla 13159 1910 15069
Large Farmers 6158 2001 8159
Medium Farmers 10694 2733 13427
Small Farmers 17696 2091 19787
Marginal Farmers 36855 7747 44602
number of bore wells. The differential loss per acre between Vanaparthy
and the other two sample villages is Rs. 2190 in Teegaram and Rs. 11720 in
Vaddicherla. The magnitude of losses increases, as the farm size declines.
On the other hand, the losses in scarcity and moderate villages could have
6. This methodology can be used to estimate the costs of degradation at the district level
based on the changes in number of wells, open as well as bore. However, estimating the
indirect costs is somewhat difficult.
24been averted if there were percolation tanks in these villages. That is the
differential loss is totally attributed to the absence of percolation tank. Though
this seems to be a strong assumption one of the recent studies dealing with
the ecological impact of tank restoration programme in drought prone areas
strongly supports this view (Reddy, et. al., 2001). These differential losses
or benefits are likely to increase at an increasing rate over time. However,
we assume that these losses would be constant over the period of five
years mainly to avoid estimation problems. These losses are comparable
with the costs of renovating an existing or converting it in to a percolation
tank, which ranges between Rs. 4000 to Rs. 6000 per acre depending on
the size with a life of 10-15 years7. As it is, the incremental losses are
above Rs. 1000 per acre per year in Teegaram and Vaddicherla villages. In
fact, conversion of old tanks into percolation tanks is more effective as far
as the impact on groundwater is concerned. Though watershed development
also helps in improving groundwater table, it is long term in nature and also
depends on the soil and climatic conditions. Watershed development does
not necessarily generate irrigation facilities in all climatic situations especially
in arid regions where average annual rainfall is below 700 mm.
Though the cost-benefit comparison of groundwater depletion vis-à-vis its
abatement (replenishment) costs makes economic as well as ecological
sense to invest in the replenishment mechanisms, there are no private
initiatives in this direction. For, these initiatives involve collective action
strategies rather than individual strategies due to the lumpy ness of the
investment. Besides, collective action is a pre requisite in tank restoration
and management. Such an approach calls for state intervention in order to
revive and restore the traditional systems. The intervention should be more
in terms of a facilitator or catalyst for collective action at the community
level. Participation of local NGOs would facilitate such policy. While
communities expect financial support from the state, a part of the investment
can be generated at the community level through user contribution and
7. Smaller the size higher the per acre costs. But 90 per cent of the tanks in Andhra Pradesh
are smaller in size i.e., less than 100 acres of command area (Reddy, et. al., 2001).
25charges. This enhances the communities stake and responsibility in managing
the systems. Though this is a difficult task requiring proper institutional
arrangements, it may not be an impossible task given the costs and benefits
from such a programme. In fact, some NGOs have demonstrated the
feasibility of high user contribution (Reddy, et. al., 2001). Such investments,
private or public, would benefit the poor farmers more.
V.    Public Policy and Environment
To recapitulate, exploitation and degradation of groundwater resources is
progressing at an alarming rate. Small and marginal farmers, who are not in
a position to access the resource, are the first victims of the externalities
arising in the process of resource degradation. Even when they have the
financial capability they are not in a position to compete with the large farmers
in deepening their wells. As a result, the costs of groundwater degradation
are disproportionately born by these farmers (vertical externalities). The
impact of resource degradation on these farmers is in two ways. Firstly,
while small and marginal farmers dominate the ownership of wells in general
and open wells in particular, medium and large farmers dominate the
ownership of bore wells. As a result of degradation majority of these farmers
loose access to water. That is they are denied of their genuine share in the
common pool resources. Secondly, one of the interesting observations of
our study is that of late bore well technology is becoming cheaper making it
size (owned land) neutral, though the process may be slow. As a result
these farmers are also investing substantial amounts of money on bore
wells. Such investments become unviable in the event of well failure. Besides,
the poor quality of technology at lower costs is resulting in high maintenance
costs and uncertainty in water supply. It is observed that groundwater
markets will take care of vertical externalities (equity problems) to a large
extent (Shah, 1993). But, evolution of water markets is possible only in the
regions where groundwater is available in sufficient quantities. Markets do
not evolve when there is not enough water to share or sell (Reddy, 2001).
This is true of our study region where groundwater markets do not operate,
as the available water is not even enough to irrigate the well owner’s land.
26This is a clear case of appropriation externalities resulting from technological
and legislative externalities. For, groundwater extraction technologies are
presently expensive and beyond the reach of the small and marginal farmers.
This externality is adversely affecting them in accessing groundwater. Added
to this are the legislative externalities, which fail to specify the property
rights in groundwater in an equitable fashion. At present, legislation does
not guarantee equity in access to groundwater resources to all sections of
the community irrespective of their land ownership. Moreover, there is no
legislation that supports sharing of groundwater equitably. Therefore, there
is strong case for internalising these externalities in a systematic fashion.
One way of doing it is, to minimise the externalities (mainly horizontal) by
strengthening the resource base i.e., improving the replenishing of
groundwater through rainwater harvesting. Technological externalities can
be addressed through making technology neutral to economic position of
the farmers. This calls for policy changes towards prioritisation of surface
minor irrigation (irrigation and percolation tanks) in the fragile regions as
well as supporting cheaper access to technology.
The cost-benefit comparison is in favour of investment in replenishment
mechanisms such as irrigation tanks and percolation tanks. The situation of
over extraction and the resultant environmental externalities is a
consequence of lack of appropriate and adequate policies (policy failure)
for managing the groundwater resources. Hither to, policies such as
subsidised credit / power / diesel are in the nature of encouraging private
initiatives for groundwater development. While these policies helped in
promoting groundwater development in the regions where groundwater
development was below potential, they have led to over exploitation of the
resource in fragile resource regions. On the other hand, no attempts were
made (at the policy level) to strengthen the natural resource base in terms
of replenishing the water table. On the contrary, groundwater development
is seen as a substitute for tanks, which are the main agents of replenishment.
In this regard State has become a mere spectator, as this process
conveniently shifted the financial burden to private people.
27The policy bias against the fragile resource regions is resulting in widening
not only the economic inequalities but also the ecological divide between
endowed and fragile resource regions. For, the neglect of resource poor
regions in the provision of protective irrigation is further weakening their
fragility. Even the recent policies in water management fail to take the needs
of these regions in to account. Groundwater, the single most important source
of irrigation, is totally left out of the purview of the water user association
legislation in Andhra Pradesh. There are no efforts to integrate well and
tank irrigation. While water user associations are found to be effective in the
canal commands they are not serving the purpose in the case of tank
irrigation (Raju, 2000 and Reddy, et. al, 2001). Unless the needs are identified
and addressed effectively, fragile resource regions will face irreversible
ecological problems like desertification.
Unfortunately, there are no policies so far that address the equity and
management aspects of groundwater. Though there are regulations on
groundwater exploitation they are inadequate and ineffective. Even the
proposed new policies are in the lines of regulation8 rather than designing
innovative policies that would integrate market and institutional dimensions
of resource management. Water policies should aim at integrating all sources
of water in the regional context rather than treating them in isolation. Demand
management is equally, if not more, important especially in the context of
scarce resources, as the supplies are limited. Demand management helps
in efficient and sustainable use of the resources when compared to supply
regulation.
In order to internalise and minimise the impact of externalities arising in the
context of groundwater depletion the following issues need immediate policy
attention:
1.  Integrated approach of groundwater development / exploitation with
surface water bodies like tanks. These two sources of water should be
treated as complements rather than substitutes. As a first step all traditional
8.   Based on the recent legislation on “Land, water and Trees” of Andhra Pradesh.
28tank systems should be revived and converted in to percolation tanks
wherever necessary. The benefits from such a programme would be
enormous when compared to the losses due to degradation and hence it
makes economic and ecological sense. Such investments would minimise
the externalities, especially horizontal.
2.  So far, groundwater is regulated through supply regulation of electricity
rather than fixing the electricity charges appropriately. That is only 9 hours
of power supply is being provided in a day in rural areas due to power
shortages. Though this has helped in checking the degradation in short run
it is not an efficient solution in the long run. The future prospect of surplus
power coupled with subsidised power prices would aggravate the process
of environmental degradation and the resulting externalities. Therefore,
economic pricing of electricity with proper monitoring facilities would be more
appropriate in order to internalise these externalities.
3.  Institutional arrangements are required to make groundwater a common
pool resource in the true sense of the term. In this regard de-linking of water
rights from land rights would help addressing the equity issues effectively
(vertical externalities). However, the transactions costs for enforcing such
a system would be enormous. In this context the experience of some NGO
(Pani Panchayat) experiments in the country where water rights are given
even to land less households would be helpful. Similarly the experiences of
countries like South Africa where attempts are being made to effectively
abolish the riparian rights on water would shed some light in this regard.
4.  In the event of high transaction costs involved with enforcing the
separation of water rights from land rights, adding the scarcity price of water
to the electricity would be appropriate. This amounts to discriminatory pricing
of power depending on the status of water resources in the region. Resources
generated from such scarcity rent can be diverted towards the development
of the sections of the local community that are unable to have access to
water for various reasons. This would not only internalise the externalities
at the regional level but also minimise the adverse impacts.
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